UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-13-2018

State v. Hicks Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45748

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Hicks Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45748" (2018). Not Reported. 4777.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4777

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
8/13/2018 10:22 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
NO. 45748
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
KOOTENAI COUNTY
v.
)
NO. CR 2015-16514
)
QUENTELL HENRI HICKS,
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
________________________
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................ 6
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 7
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution .................................. 7
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................. 10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)..............................................................................2
State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599 (2011)..................................................................................... 7, 8
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013)..........................................................................................8
State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916 (2017) .......................................................................................7
Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589 (2003) ..............................................7

Statutes
I.C. § 18-903 ........................................................................................................................... 1, 2
I.C. § 18-918(5) ..........................................................................................................................1
I.C. § 19-2514 .............................................................................................................................1
I.C. § 19-5304 ......................................................................................................................... 7, 8
I.C. § 28-22-104(2) .....................................................................................................................5

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Quentell Henri Hicks asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
ordered restitution in his case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 7, 2015, Coeur d’Alene police officers responded to a reported domestic
violence call. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) The officers learned Mr. Hicks had
fled the scene, and later found him. (See PSI, p.3.) After being detained in handcuffs and read
his Miranda rights, Mr. Hicks stated he had been arguing with his domestic partner, Jan White.
(PSI, p.3; see PSI, p.4.) Mr. Hicks stated Ms. White had threatened to kill him, and, fearing for
his life, he held her down to protect himself. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hicks reported he then became
involved in a verbal and physical confrontation with Ms. White’s son, Derrick Baker, and
Mr. Hicks fled the area for his own safety. (See PSI, p.3.) An officer saw abrasions and
scratches on Mr. Hicks. (PSI, p.3.)
Ms. White stated Mr. Hicks struck her in the face with his fist multiple times, and she
reported experiencing pain in her left forearm; however, an officer did not see any marks on her.
(See PSI, p.3.) Ms. White was reportedly very upset and worried about getting to her new job.
(PSI, p.3.) Mr. Baker stated he saw Mr. Hicks strike Ms. White twice in the face. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Baker reported he told Mr. Hicks to get off her, Mr. Hicks tried to hit him, and then they
both started wrestling. (PSI, p.3.) After Mr. Hicks left the scene, Mr. Baker realized he had
been bitten on his right shoulder by Mr. Hicks. (See PSI, p.3.)
The State charged Mr. Hicks by Information with one count of felony domestic battery,
I.C. §§18-903 and 18-918(5), with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement under I.C. § 19-
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2514, for hitting Ms. White, as well as one count of misdemeanor battery, I.C. § 18-903, for
biting Mr. Baker. (R., pp.66-68.) Mr. Hicks initially pleaded not guilty. (R., pp.69-70.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Hicks subsequently agreed to plead guilty, by way of an
Alford plea,1 to felony domestic battery. (See R., pp.72-76.) The State agreed to dismiss the
misdemeanor battery charge and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (See R., pp.7778, 80-81.) The district court accepted Mr. Hicks’ plea. (R., p.73.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.95-96.) After Mr. Hicks participated in a “rider,” the district court
suspended the sentence and placed him on supervised probation for a period of four years.
(R., pp.102-06.)
About four months later, the State filed a Report of Probation Violation, alleging
Mr. Hicks had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. (R., pp.111-13.) Mr. Hicks
admitted to violating his probation by using methamphetamine on three separate occasions and
missing aftercare group sessions. (R., pp.118-19; see R., pp.111-12.) The district court revoked
Mr. Hicks’ probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.121-22.) Mr. Hicks participated in
another rider, and the district court then suspended the sentence and placed him on supervised
probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.130-35.)
Meanwhile, the State filed a Memorandum of Restitution, requesting an award of
restitution to the Idaho Industrial Commission’s Crime Victims Compensation Program (CVCP)
in the amount of $9,650. (R., pp.125-28.) At the restitution hearing, Erica Chown, a financial
recovery officer with CVCP, testified Ms. White had made a claim for time missed from work.
(See Tr., p.6, L.10 – p.9, L.1.) Ms. Chown testified, “Ms. White actually indicated that she had
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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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missed work as a result of the crime. She didn’t indicate specifically what work she missed. We
actually requested that information directly from her employer, and then we also corroborated
her crime-related disability from work with her treating health care provider.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.410.) CVCP “determined a compensable amount of $9,650.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.11-14.) Ms. Chown
testified, “we used the information that was provided by the health care provider and by the
employer to establish a period of disability during which [Ms. White] missed work due to crimerelated injuries, and then our program pays a maximum of $175 or two-thirds of the average
weekly wage for the time period that was established that the victim missed work . . . and that
totals $9,650.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.17-25.)
Ms. Chown then testified there were “four specific periods of time that were missed and
verified by the employer and the health care providers.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-11.) CVCP disbursed
$200 for October 7 to October 14, 2015, $25 for October 16, 2015, $325 for October 25 to
November 1, 2015, and $9,100 for November 3, 2015 to October 31, 2016. (Tr., p.10, L.12 –
p.11, L.2; see Plaintiff’s Ex. 1.) The State admitted into evidence the CVCP working ledger
documenting those periods of time. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1; see Tr., p.12, Ls.8-14.)
Ms. Chown verified the fourth period of time was nearly a year long. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1518.) She testified CVCP “actually received documentation from a treating health care provider
indicating a formal diagnosis that was related to the crime and disabled Jan White from work for
the indicated period of time.” (Tr., p.13, L.19 – p.14, L.1.) Ms. Chown was not aware of
whether or not Ms. White was able to return to work after October 31, 2016. (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5.)
On cross-examination, Ms. Chown testified the eligibility requirements for CVCP
included that “there must be a preponderance of the evidence that criminal[ly] injurious conduct
occurred.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-17.) She testified that “criminally injurious conduct that we establish

3

by preponderance of the evidence is indicated by criminal charges being filed physically,” and
the conduct that made Ms. White eligible was the domestic battery charge filed against
Mr. Hicks. (Tr., p.15, L.23 – p.16, L.19.) Ms. Chown testified Ms. White had a diagnosis of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a crime-related injury, as diagnosed by a doctor of
psychology. (See Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.6.) Mr. Hicks had not been informed of Ms. White’s
eligibility before CVCP compensated her. (See Tr., p.17, L.24 – p.19, L.12.)
On redirect examination, Ms. Chown testified the checks to Ms. White were issued on
November 18, 2016. (Tr., p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.1.)
Mr. Hicks testified that when he first met Ms. White in January 2013, she was not
employed at the time.

(Tr., p.22, Ls.1-25.) He testified that on the day of the incident,

October 7, 2015, she was employed that day, as it was “her first day of work.” (Tr., p.23, Ls.16.) From January 2013 to October 7, 2015, Ms. White was not employed. (Tr., p.23, Ls.8-11.)
Mr. Hicks testified she was not physically injured from the incident. (Tr., p.23, Ls.12-14.)
Mr. Hicks testified he would be willing to compensate CVCP for the amount paid for the
first three periods of time, a total of $550. (See Tr., p.23, L.15 – p.24, L.3.) He then testified,
“Ms. White has never had any employment history. She gets a job and she just doesn’t want to
go. She recently just had a job that . . . she went two days and then the next day that she was
supposed to work she fell ill. Ms. White just does not want to work.” (Tr., p.24, Ls.9-14.)
Additionally, Mr. Hicks testified that Ms. White’s “stress/PTSD, it’s caused from her
divorce that she’s been going through and that she’s unable to get compensation from her exhusband . . . over the sale of her house.” (Tr., p.24, Ls.15-18.) According to Mr. Hicks,
“Ms. White is not willing to work. She wants to live off other people’s money . . . .” (Tr., p.24,
Ls.18-19.) Mr. Hicks testified he wanted to “file criminal charges for some forgery that she’s
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written on my bank account while I was in prison that I’m taking up with Wells Fargo because in
that claim there’s like $3,000 that she tried to get out of me while I was locked up.” (See
Tr., p.24, Ls.20-24.) He did not feel it was fair that he would have to pay “over $9,000 to a
woman who is not wanting or willing to work. I don’t find that fair at all.” (Tr., p.24, L.25 –
p.25, L.3.)
Mr. Hicks’ counsel then asserted restitution “would be fair and just for basically the first
month given the fact that Ms. White had no employment history . . . and in effect, told [CVCP]
that she was a regular employee and lost time because of this incident, when in reality she didn’t
have a job prior to it.” (Tr., p.25, L.19 – p.26, L.2.) However, defense counsel confirmed
Ms. White had a job the day of the incident. (See Tr., p.26, Ls.3-4.) Mr. Hicks’ counsel
asserted, “[w]hen you have to show lost wages, you have to show that there was in fact a pattern
of employment.” (See Tr., p.26, Ls.12-14.) Defense counsel was not able to provide any
authority requiring a work pattern to establish wage loss. (See Tr., p.26, L.12 – p.27, L.11.)
The district court stated, “I don’t know of any tenet of law, any case, and body that would
require the victim in this case to have established a prior work history.” (Tr., p.28, Ls.2-4.) The
district court issued an Order of Restitution, awarding CVCP a total of $9,650, with statutory
interest under I.C. § 28-22-104(2) accruing from October 7, 2015. (R., pp.146-47; see Tr., p.27,
L.15 – p.28, L.12.)
Mr. Hicks filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order of Restitution.
(R., pp.148-51.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered restitution?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution
Mr. Hicks asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution in
his case. Idaho Code § 19-5304 permits a court to order restitution for “any crime which results
in an economic loss to the victim.” I.C. § 19-5304(2). Section 19-5304 defines victim as
including “[t]he account established pursuant to the crime victims compensation act, chapter 10,
title 72, Idaho Code, from which payment was made to or on behalf of a directly injured victim
pursuant to the requirements of Idaho law as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.”
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iii). The term economic loss “includes, but is not limited to, the value of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket
losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct, but does not
include less tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress.”
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that whether to order restitution, and in what amount,
is within the district court’s discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in
I.C. § 19-5304(7). State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919 (2017) (citing State v. Corbus, 150
Idaho 599, 602 (2011)). When determining whether a district court abused its discretion, an
appellate court evaluates whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant
legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (citing Swallow v.
Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592 (2003)). The Wisdom Court held, “[t]he
second and third requirements of that inquiry require the district court to base the restitution
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award on the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or
presentence investigator.” Id. (citing I.C. § 19-5304(6)).
The Wisdom Court also held, “[w]hat amount of restitution to award is a question of fact
for the district court, whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.”
Id. (citing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602). “Substantial evidence is ‘relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,
885 (2013)).
Mr. Hicks asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution. The
district court did not adequately consider Ms. White’s lack of employment history and the causes
of her stress and PTSD, as attested to by Mr. Hicks. Mr. Hicks testified at the restitution hearing
that Ms. White had no employment history.

(See Tr., p.24, Ls.9-14.)

He also indicated

Ms. White’s stress and PTSD were caused by her divorce and her inability to get compensation
from her ex-husband. (See Tr., p.24, Ls.15-18.) Further, as Mr. Hicks’ counsel asserted at the
hearing, restitution “would be fair and just for basically the first month given the fact that
Ms. White had no employment history . . . and in effect, told [CVCP] that she was a regular
employee and lost time because of this incident, when in reality she didn’t have a job prior to it.”
(See Tr., p.25, L.19 – p.26, L.2.) In light of the above, the proper amount of restitution that
should have been awarded to CVCP was $550, the amount for the first three periods of time.
(See Tr., p.23, L.24 – p.24, L.3, p.25, L.19 – p.26, L.2.) By instead awarding CVCP the full
amount of $9,650 requested by the State, the district court abused its discretion.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Hicks respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s order of restitution, with instructions to enter a new order of restitution awarding a total
of $550 to CVCP.
DATED this 13th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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